---
title: "Lebanon's Crises and Al-Aqsa Flood | Ghazi Mahmoud"
url: https://ghazimahmoud.com/en/articles/2023-11-01-d10880/
lang: en
description: "The repercussions of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which was launched on October 7, 2023, are widening to reach the eastern Mediterranean and perhaps the entire Middle East, after the reverberations of this operation swept across the countries of the region in various and differing forms."
---

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# Lebanon's Crises and Al-Aqsa Flood

[Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Dr. Ghazi Mahmoud](https://ghazimahmoud.com/en/about/)

1 Nov 2023 · 7 min read

[The Lebanese economy](https://ghazimahmoud.com/en/articles/leb/)[The world economy](https://ghazimahmoud.com/en/articles/world/)[Politics and security](https://ghazimahmoud.com/en/articles/geo/)

The repercussions of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which was launched on October 7, 2023, are widening to reach the eastern Mediterranean and perhaps the entire Middle East, after the reverberations of this operation swept across the countries of the region in various and differing forms. Today, Lebanon is in the midst of this flood, which remains in its early stages according to news reports and intelligence leaks, particularly as the Israeli massacre against Gaza and its children continues, and military confrontations in southern Lebanon escalate, threatening both people and infrastructure.

Meanwhile, Lebanon continues to reel under the fallout of its financial and economic crisis that began at the end of 2019, while its political crisis deepens, preventing any serious domestic initiative to halt the ongoing collapse. The presidential vacuum is completing its first year with no serious attempt on the horizon to elect a new president of the republic, while the initiative of the Quintet Committee remains stalled as a result of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and the conflicting priorities of its members on the Lebanese scene.

While hopes had been pinned on the wealth lying beneath the seabed of Lebanon's exclusive economic zone in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea, and on the approaching moment of extracting the promised gas just like Lebanon's neighboring countries, the halt to completing the drilling of the exploratory well in Block 9 turned matters upside down in a repeat of the Block 4 episode, a halt that can only be viewed as a scenario to keep Lebanon from developing its petroleum resources in that block and others.

Whereas the undeclared reason for ending exploration operations in Block 4 was to pressure Lebanon into proceeding with the demarcation of the southern borders of its exclusive economic zone with the Israeli enemy, the halt to completing drilling in Block 9 comes in parallel with Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and pressure to prevent Lebanon from supporting the Palestinian resistance. Indeed, the company that owns the drilling rig Transocean Barents is an American company contracted by TotalEnergies to drill the well. If this indicates anything, it shows that extracting gas and oil is a geopolitical decision whose timing is tied to regional and international calculations beyond the capacity of local actors.

Setting aside political considerations and regional calculations, it is surprising that the Exploration and Production Agreement with the operating company is limited to drilling a single exploratory well in each of Blocks 4 and 9, and does not stipulate the obligation to drill additional exploratory wells, at least in the event that drilling results in a dry well. Limiting exploratory drilling to a single well is insufficient, since exploration requires drilling at least three wells to establish certainty beyond doubt, given that the discovery rate of a productive well ranges from one in three wells to one in five wells.

It is worth noting that most international production agreements (International Product Agreements) oblige operating companies to drill no fewer than three exploratory wells in the block covered by the agreement. At the same time, these agreements preserve the operating company's right to account for and recover the costs of drilling all exploratory wells, including those that did not lead to productive discoveries.

Despite the importance of seismic surveys and geophysical prospecting in assessing potential hydrocarbon resources, the ultimate and sole method for proving the presence of oil and gas is drilling exploratory wells. Drilling multiple exploratory wells in areas being explored for the first time is dictated by experience, especially since productive wells have often been discovered only after the failure of numerous preceding attempts. The best example of this is the Zohr field, discovered by the Italian company Eni off the Egyptian coast in 2015, after the American company Shell had worked on exploring the area for 15 years to no avail.

The Italian company moved into Egypt's Shorouk area after acquiring the exploration rights there from Shell, discovering the Zohr field, which is considered one of the largest natural gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean basin. Notably, Eni had previously failed to achieve positive results from drilling the Cypriot wells Onasagoras and Amathousa, and it is one of the three consortium companies holding two exclusive petroleum licenses to carry out exploration and production activities in Lebanese waters.

Moreover, drilling Tamar-5 in 2011 yielded only a dry well, even though the Tamar field had been discovered in 2009 after drilling two appraisal wells, the first being Tamar-1 and the second Tamar-2, and entered production in 2013, demonstrating that drilling in a productive field does not necessarily yield a productive well. Notably, the drilling of Tamar-5 was accompanied by the drilling of three other wells, Tamar-3, Tamar-4, and Tamar-6, all of which were productive; indeed, drilling at Tamar-3 revealed a new layer of natural gas, Layer D, found at a depth of 5,160 meters.

Developing discovered reserves does not stop at the minimum number of exploratory wells that must be drilled, but also encompasses the timeframe required to transition from the exploration phase to the production phase, which in turn requires timelines of no less than three years. Moving to production requires that exploration yield at least one productive well containing commercial quantities that offset the costs of drilling and development operations, guarantee a profit for the operating company, and generate sufficient returns to pay royalties, the state's share of profit petroleum, and other fees.

Transitioning from the exploration phase in the Tamar field to the production phase took four years, as developing this field lasted from 2009, the date gas was discovered there, until 2013, the date production began. The Leviathan field, discovered in 2010, fared no better than the Tamar field; indeed, transitioning to the production phase required six years, with production beginning in 2016. The timelines separating the exploration phase from the production phase are realistic timeframes dictated by the nature and complexities of the extractive industry.

The conditions of exploring petroleum resources, in terms of the minimum number of wells, determining the volume of available reserves, and the timelines required for exploration on the one hand and for developing wells and preparing them for production on the other, contradict the upbeat reports that were promoted about cutting corners and moving directly and rapidly from the exploration phase to the production phase. The failure of the Exploration and Production Agreement to provide for the obligation to drill 3 consecutive appraisal wells in the licensed block leads to further wasted time in exploring the reserves indicated by studies, and prolongs the wait for the phase of well development and the start of production.

Yet the problem lies not so much in the timelines required to drill the minimum number of exploratory wells and develop productive wells, as in the technical aspects impeding the progress of drilling operations, and the geopolitical factors accompanying the progress of exploration work and the intentions harbored by influential states to facilitate or obstruct it. Conversely, betting that the mere extraction of gas and oil from the exclusive economic zone will constitute a magic bullet for Lebanon's financial and economic crisis involves a great deal of exaggeration and excessive optimism.

That is because the financial and economic crisis afflicting Lebanon is a structural crisis, and the years that have elapsed since its onset, during which it nearly destroyed Lebanon and its people, have proven that those who caused it cannot address it or devise solutions for it. Today, just as much as Lebanon needs to be governed with a new and creative mindset, it needs to rid itself of traditional paper-based administration and adopt an efficient, advanced, and transparent administration that ensures the state collects its rightful fees and taxes, and simplifies and accelerates transactions with official departments whether they concern individuals or institutions and companies.

Until Lebanon is permitted to benefit from its petroleum resources, a future action plan must be drawn up that enables an exit from the prevailing stagnation in state administration at all levels, modeled on the recent emergency plan to confront the repercussions of a war on Lebanon should it break out, bearing in mind that the majority of reforms do not require financial appropriations, but rather amendments to the laws and regulations in force. Postponing available solutions and tying them to regional issues and to a comprehensive settlement of Lebanon's political and economic crisis inflicts grave injustice upon the Lebanese people; gradual, cumulative solutions to Lebanon's crises are the only feasible path forward in a time of lost solutions.

Translated from Arabic with AI. [Read it in Arabic](https://ghazimahmoud.com/articles/2023-11-01-d10880/)

## Published in

- [Channel 23](https://ch23.com/Article/114619/خاص-:-أزمات-لبنان-وطوافان-الاقصى)
- [Lebanon Files](https://archive.lebanonfiles.com/2023/articles/باقلامهم/أزمات-لبنان-وطوفان-الاقصى/)
- [Radar News](https://www.radar-news.net/أزمات-لبنان-وطوافان-الاقصى-العميد-الم/)
- [Mahatat News](https://www.mahatatnews.net/archives/80430)
- [OZ Arab Media](https://ozarab.media/أزمات-لبنان-وطوافان-الاقصى/)

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[29 Mar 2023 · Accelerating Collapse Heightens the Need for Renewable Energy · LinkedIn ](https://ghazimahmoud.com/en/articles/2023-03-29-087b08/)

[12 Mar 2023 · A Reading of the Preludes to the Collapse and Its Causes · LinkedIn, OZ Arab Media ](https://ghazimahmoud.com/en/articles/2023-03-12-54d29f/)