Lebanon and the Challenges of Delimiting Its Exclusive Economic Zone

The issue of oil and gas exploration in Lebanon's Exclusive Economic Zone is once again capturing domestic, and perhaps regional and international, attention, especially after oil and gas regained their prominence in the energy mix following the Russian-Ukrainian war and its repercussions, and gained strong momentum with the new US administration, its declaration of a national energy emergency, and its efforts to lower energy prices. Ghazi Mahmoud* However, translating domestic interest in restoring momentum to the exploration process, which President General Joseph Aoun has expressed on more than one occasion, faces several obstacles at multiple levels, particularly at the level of the policies and mechanisms adopted to manage the oil and gas sector, which have failed to take the national interest into account. Some of these obstacles also stem from the exploration and production agreements. Perhaps the most significant obstacle lies in completing the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone borders, particularly in the north, and resolving the border dispute arising from the discrepancy between the Lebanese and Syrian boundary lines, a dispute that is hindering oil and gas exploration in the north. Indeed, Lebanon was unable to begin exploration in Block 9 until after the southern border of the Exclusive Economic Zone had been delimited, despite having signed an exploration and production agreement with a consortium comprising France's TotalEnergies, Italy's Eni, and Russia's Novatek (later replaced by QatarEnergy) in the first licensing round in 2017. An Ambiguous and Flawed Delimitation with Cyprus: Lebanon signed an agreement with Cyprus to delimit the Exclusive Economic Zone borders in 2007, though it has yet to be ratified. It later emerged that the adopted delimitation was inaccurate, because the boundary had been determined on the basis of the median line without taking into account the principle of proportionality between the coastal lengths of the two countries, which stands at approximately 1.83 for Lebanon to 1 for Cyprus. This was set according to six specific geographical points from "1" to "6", as shown on the attached map and in the list of geographical coordinates annexed to the agreement. (The Exclusive Economic Zone borders from Point 7 in the north to Point 23 in the south.) As a result of the agreement, Lebanon obtained an area of only 17,573.7 square kilometers instead of the 20,217.55 square kilometers it would have received had the criterion of proportionality between the lengths of the general direction of both countries' coastlines been applied. This deprived Lebanon of an area of 2,643.85 square kilometers, while Cyprus obtained 13,691.641 square kilometers. The draft agreement was re-examined by a committee appointed by the Lebanese Council of Ministers in December 2008. In April 2009, the committee concluded by unilaterally defining the borders of the Lebanese Exclusive Economic Zone, adding Point 7 north of Point 6 toward Syria and Point 23 south of Point 1 toward Israel. The new coordinates were deposited with the United Nations in July 2010. ... And an Incomplete Delimitation with Israel: The southern border of the Lebanese Exclusive Economic Zone was determined through indirect negotiations between the Lebanese and Israeli sides, mediated by the United States and under the auspices of the United Nations, which concluded with the delimitation of the border based on what became known as Line 23. Ironically, Israel had already adopted Line 23 since March 2009 in charting and allocating parcels (blocks) in the northern part of its Exclusive Economic Zone. (Read also: Maritime Border Delimitation: The "Israeli" Block 72 Mine and the Lebanese Minesweeper.) It is worth noting that the southern border of the Lebanese Exclusive Economic Zone lies at Line 29, according to a study prepared in 2013 by Lebanese Army Colonel Mazen Basbous, in which he argued that Line "23" lacks the scientific criteria relied upon in maritime border delimitation. That was also the view of the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO), which the Lebanese government commissioned to study the maritime border separating the Exclusive Economic Zones of Lebanon and Israel. By accepting Line 23, the Lebanese state disregarded the established rule in border delimitation, namely the rule of respecting inherited borders (Uti possidetis juris), as well as the obligation to respect and abide by the provisions of the Paulet-Newcombe Agreement, approved on March 7, 1923, which stipulated that Lebanon's border with Palestine begins at Ras al-Naqoura on the Mediterranean Sea up to 50 meters from the crest line. Consequently, the delimitation was not completed due to the dispute over the land point from which Line 23 originates, known as Point (B1). The delimitation remains incomplete, as there is an undelimited stretch commonly referred to as the "Line of Buoys". Regardless of the foregoing, Line 23 became the southern border following the signing of the maritime border delimitation agreement between Israel and Lebanon on October 27, 2022. ... And No Delimitation with Syria: As for the northern border of the Exclusive Economic Zone between Lebanon and Syria, it is in no better shape and likewise remains unresolved. The delimitations adopted by each of the two countries reveal a border overlap exceeding 750 square kilometers in favor of the Syrian side. (The Syrian delimitation carves out approximately 750 sq km of Lebanese waters.) This overlap stems from differing methodologies followed in delimitation: Lebanon relied on what is known as "equity in dividing waters", choosing the "equidistant points" method, which makes the median line equidistant from the coasts of the two states the boundary line between them, whereas Syria adopted the method of drawing a horizontal line extending from the midpoint of the Nahr al-Kabir al-Janoubi river into the sea along lines of latitude. (Read also: Lebanon's Gas: The "Tremor" of Turkish-Syrian Maritime Border Delimitation and Its "Aftershocks" (1 of 2).) This overlap encompasses Blocks 1 and 2 in the Lebanese zone, discouraging oil companies from operating in these two blocks and consequently necessitating negotiations with Syria on border delimitation to reach an agreement regulating the exploitation and sharing of production in the event of overlapping reservoirs. Today, following the fall of the former regime and the assumption of power by a new administration in Syria, it is imperative to reach an agreement on delimiting the Exclusive Economic Zone borders between the two countries at the earliest possible opportunity. Without this delimitation, neither country will find companies willing to explore for oil and gas in the disputed blocks. Conclusion: Completing the delimitation of Lebanon's maritime borders represents an essential step toward asserting Lebanon's sovereignty over its maritime waters, protecting its natural resources, and ensuring their optimal exploitation. Today, with the launch of the new era in Lebanon and the fall of the former regime in Syria, an important opportunity looms for Lebanon to urge the new Syrian administration on the necessity of delimiting the maritime borders between the two countries on fair and internationally agreed foundations, as this delimitation is an indispensable, pivotal step to preserve the rights of both countries and open horizons for exploiting their oil wealth in a manner that enhances their economic security. (Read also: Lebanon: Priority for Establishing a National Oil Company and a National Delimitation Authority.) Alongside this, reviewing the delimitation agreement with Cyprus is of particular importance, especially after the recent agreement between Lebanon and Israel on Point 23. This development requires Cyprus to adjust its approach to border delimitation, given that Point 1 no longer constitutes a tripoint. Equally important is redefining the median line in accordance with the principle of proportionality and taking into account the length of the general direction of the coastline in both countries. Lebanon must also reassess its maritime border delimitation agreement with Israel, leveraging international backing, particularly US support, to press for a review of the terms that are unfair to Lebanon. This includes reconsidering the areas it conceded, as well as completing the delimitation within territorial waters starting from the land border line at Point B1, thereby preventing Israel from maintaining any presence inside Lebanese waters. As the state completes its institutional pillars and constitutional institutions regain their effective role, it becomes necessary to renegotiate with both Cyprus and Israel to rectify the flaws marring the concluded agreements and recover Lebanon's rights to its waters and resources. Stepping back from an error and correcting it is a virtue, and demanding squandered rights is the duty of every official. * Researcher in economic affairs

Translated from Arabic with AI. Read it in Arabic