The Region's Wars and Their Economic Limits
Renewed interest in the eastern Mediterranean basin stems from estimates by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) of undiscovered, technically recoverable hydrocarbon resources in this basin, conducted as part of its global petroleum assessment in July 2021. It estimated mean oil resources at 960 million barrels and the mean volume of natural gas resources at 316.25 trillion cubic feet (TCFG), in addition to natural gas liquids resources averaging 2,348 million barrels (MMBNGL).
By 2019, discovered and proven natural gas reserves had reached approximately 82 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in the exclusive economic zones of the eastern basin belonging to Egypt in the Zohr field, Cyprus in the Aphrodite field, and the Tamar and Leviathan fields in Israel, and they are poised to rise further with the Karish field, which marked the final discovery of that year. This allowed a large portion of the US Geological Survey's estimates to be turned into tangible reality.
These discoveries add to the standing of the Middle East and increase its importance, given that around 47% of global oil reserves as well as 41% of gas reserves are concentrated there. However, the recent discoveries have shifted the race for energy sources from the Persian Gulf region and its vast reserves to the eastern Mediterranean basin, situated at the crossroads of Asia, Europe and Africa, and home to the world's most important trade routes, particularly the straits of Suez, the Bosphorus and Gibraltar.
At the same time, tensions among the world's nations are escalating amid energy wars that have triggered radical changes in international alliances and reshaped states' strategic policies to match the emerging geography of energy. This reflects the central economic dimensions that energy holds in modern economies, while the aim of wars and their primary driver is economics, through control over resources and wealth. The shifting wars in the Middle East are no exception to other wars aimed at controlling energy sources or, at a minimum, securing lasting access to them and the continuity of their supplies.
The bet had been that gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean basin would contribute to changing economic relations among its states, ultimately bringing about a geopolitical shift capable of protecting the region's energy market. This formed part of a vision launched by the United States under the name of "gas diplomacy", aimed at using the region's newfound wealth to bring its warring countries to the negotiating table, yet ongoing regional conflicts and their complexities prevented this. Moreover, the Russia-Ukraine war shattered the relative stability in the oil resources market, causing energy wars once again to overshadow "gas diplomacy".
Perhaps the most prominent development in these energy wars is the effort by the United States to tighten the European stranglehold on Russian and Iranian gas. Notably, this war is not confined to the United States and Europe on one side and Russia and Iran on the other, but also encompasses Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, Cyprus, China and others, portending escalating tension and threatening global peace. Meanwhile, amid the sanctions it faces, Russia is seeking to preserve its position as a major supplier of natural gas to Europe by reshaping its alliances and strategic interests with the European continent.
On the other hand, fast-moving realities compel European Union countries to search for new sources to meet their medium-term energy needs, beyond those located in the eastern Mediterranean basin. This is particularly so given that the reserves of the eastern Mediterranean basin countries where gas has been discovered, with the exception of Israel, have been unable to form a permanent and reliable source, as with Egypt, whose natural gas production has declined, while other countries such as Lebanon have been unable to carry out exploration to reach productive wells.
Furthermore, the availability of resources in the countries of the region, particularly Israel, has not prevented the continuation of its ambitions toward the region's wealth, as preventing the Palestinians from developing the Marine field, discovered off the coast of Gaza in 2000, represents evidence of its ambitions and one of the reasons for its war on the Gaza Strip. This raises the question of whether economic objectives will reorder priorities and prevent the continuation of military wars, replacing them with energy wars, which may prove no less damaging to the economies of the countries concerned than military wars.
Paradoxically, the confrontations that took place between the Israeli enemy and Hezbollah over more than thirteen months, which caused destruction in Lebanese border villages and towns and in Israeli settlements alike, did not extend to the enemy's offshore gas fields, which remained safe from the resistance's missiles. This was despite Israel escalating its savage and devastating aggression against Lebanon over the past three months, raising questions about the margins of military confrontations in the Middle East, and what is permitted within them and what is not.
The limits imposed on oil and gas wars bring to mind the United States preventing Israel from striking Iranian oil facilities in its latest retaliation for Iran's attack against it. The limits of oil and gas wars likewise apply to Russian gas, which continues to flow to Europe across Ukrainian territory, albeit in smaller quantities, despite European sanctions on the one hand and the fierce war raging between the two countries on the other.
These, then, are new equations in international relations imposed by energy on exporting and importing countries alike, an equation that can be summed up as the priority of stable energy supplies, and consequently the stability of the global economy, over other considerations. Perhaps this also explains the stability of oil and gas prices within narrow margins, despite the wars raging on both the energy fronts themselves and the military fronts.
Translated from Arabic with AI. Read it in Arabic