The Limits of Oil and Gas Wars in the Middle East

Renewed interest in the Eastern Mediterranean basin stems from estimates by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) of undiscovered, technically recoverable hydrocarbon resources in this basin, conducted as part of its global petroleum assessment in July 2021. It estimated mean oil resources at 960 million barrels and the mean volume of natural gas resources at 316.25 trillion cubic feet (TCFG), in addition to natural gas liquids resources averaging 2,348 million barrels (MMBNGL). By 2019, discovered and proven natural gas reserves had reached nearly 82 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in the exclusive economic zones of the Eastern Basin belonging to Egypt in the Zohr field, Cyprus in the Aphrodite field, and the Tamar and Leviathan fields in Israel, and they are poised to rise further with the Karish field, which marked the last of that year's discoveries, allowing a large part of the US Geological Survey's estimates to become tangible reality. These discoveries add to the Middle East's standing and increase its importance, given that around 47% of global oil reserves, in addition to 41% of gas reserves, are concentrated there. Yet the recent discoveries have shifted the race for energy sources from the Arabian Gulf region and its vast reserves to the Eastern Mediterranean basin, located at the crossroads of the continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa, and home to the world's most important trade routes, notably the straits of Suez, the Bosporus, and Gibraltar. On the other hand, tensions among the countries of the world are escalating amid energy wars that have caused radical shifts in international alliances and reshaped states' strategic policies to suit the emerging energy geography. This reflects the pivotal economic dimensions that energy represents in modern economies, whereas the objective of wars and their primary driver is the economy, through control over resources and wealth. The shifting wars in the Middle East are no exception to other wars aimed at controlling energy sources or, at a minimum, securing permanent access to them and the continuity of their supplies. The bet had been that gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean basin would contribute to changing economic relations among its countries, ultimately bringing about geopolitical change that protects the region's energy market. This fell within a vision launched by the United States under the name "gas diplomacy," aimed at using the new wealth in the region to bring its warring countries to the negotiating table, but the continuation of regional conflicts and their complexities prevented it. Moreover, the Russian-Ukrainian war disrupted the relative stability in the oil resources market, causing energy wars once again to overshadow "gas diplomacy." Perhaps the most prominent development in these energy wars is the effort by the United States of America to tighten the European noose on Russian and Iranian gas. Notably, this war is not limited to the United States and Europe on one hand and Russia and Iran on the other, but also includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, Cyprus, China, and others, portending escalating tensions and threatening world peace, at a time when Russia, amid the sanctions it faces, seeks to maintain its position as a major supplier of natural gas to Europe by reshaping its alliances and strategic interests with the European continent. Conversely, fast-moving realities compel European Union countries to search for new sources to meet their energy needs over the medium term, other than those located in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, especially since the reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean basin countries where gas has been discovered, with the exception of Israel, have been unable to form a permanent and reliable source, much like Egypt, whose natural gas production has declined, while other countries such as Lebanon have been unable to carry out exploration to reach productive wells. Nor has the availability of resources in the countries of the region, particularly Israel, prevented the continuation of its ambitions for the region's wealth, as preventing the Palestinians from developing the Marine field, which was discovered off the coast of Gaza in 2000, represents proof of its ambitions and one of the reasons for its war on the Gaza Strip. This raises the question of whether economic objectives will reorder priorities and prevent the continuation of military wars, replacing them with energy wars, which may be no less harmful to the economies of the countries concerned than military wars. Ironically, the confrontations that took place between the Israeli enemy and Hezbollah over more than thirteen months, causing destruction in Lebanese border villages and towns and in Israeli settlements alike, did not include the enemy's offshore gas fields, which remained safe from the resistance's missiles. This was despite Israel escalating its barbaric and destructive aggression against Lebanon during the last three months, raising questions about the margins of military confrontations in the Middle East, what is permitted in them, and what is not permitted. The limits imposed on oil and gas wars bring to mind the United States of America preventing Israel from striking Iranian oil facilities in its recent response to Iran's attack on it. Likewise, the limits of oil and gas wars apply to Russian gas, which still flows to Europe across Ukrainian territory, albeit in smaller quantities, despite European sanctions on one hand and the fierce war raging between the two countries on the other. Thus, these are new equations in international relations imposed by energy on exporting and importing countries alike, an equation that can be summed up in the priority of stable energy supplies, and consequently the stability of the global economy, over other considerations. Perhaps this also explains the stability of oil and gas prices within narrow margins, despite the wars raging on both the energy fronts themselves and the military fronts.

Translated from Arabic with AI. Read it in Arabic